



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COMOR-D-47/8

5 October 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

SUBJECT: Views of the United States Intelligence Board on Resumption of U-2 Overflights of the USSR

1. Attached for the information of the members of the United States Intelligence Board and COMOR is a copy of the conclusions referred by the USIB to the Special Group at its meeting on 5 October 1961. It was forwarded this afternoon to the Special Group Officer.

2. This paper was the result of the USIB consideration of COMOR-D-47/7.




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Chairman
Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

Attachment:
Memo to the Special Group

Copy 9--State TCO
10--OSD
11--JCS TCO
12--OACSI TCO
13--ONI TCO
14, 15, 16---AFCIN TCO
17, 18---NSA TCO

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COMOR-D-47/8

5 October 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Special Group

SUBJECT: Views of the United States Intelligence Board on Resumption of U-2 Overflights of the USSR

1. The USIB has considered the intelligence which could be obtained through a limited number of U-2 flights (say 3 or 4) directed at the highest priority targets bearing on the USSR missile capability to attack the U. S. and its Allies. The information, if obtained, would certainly refine our estimates and increase the confidence in our assessment of the current threat. In particular, it would provide information on the operational characteristics and readiness of these Soviet weapons systems.

2. We are mindful of the operational and political risks involved in such an undertaking. Our assessment of the intelligence which might be obtained, in the light of our appreciation of the political and operational factors involved, does not justify our urging U-2 flights over the USSR at this time.


3. We note that most of our major highest priority targets are located in the northern area of the USSR. The sun angle during

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several months after late November will make useful photography impossible to obtain in the far north and difficult to obtain in the remainder of this area. Overflights of most of the critical targets would be feasible this year only between now and late November.

Copy 1-7 Special Group


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Copy 1-7--Special Group

8--AC/DPD

19--DDI(P) TCO

20--OCI TCO

21--OSI TCO

22--ORR TCO

23--DIR NPIC

24--TSO CIA

25--C/DMD/NPIC

26--PAD/NPIC


27--DDP TCO

28--Intel/DPD

29--SO/DPD

31-34--C/SRS/DPD/DDP

30--Liaison Officer/NPIC



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